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Introduction 
Technology policies, and economic policies more generally, are means by which countries can 
maintain or increase their autonomy within the international political economy.  Concretely, 
autonomy in this sense refers to a country’s capacity to adapt to or insulate domestic industry 
from external shifts.  An important component of this capacity for more advanced developing 
countries is the ability to sustain technological upgrading, independent of foreign control.  This 
paper explores two propositions.  One is that, owing to increasingly international production 
structures, the range of growth-promoting technology strategies has narrowed for the developing 
countries of Southeast Asia over the past decade or so. The second is that the institutional and 
political challenges of pursuing indigenous technological development and industrial upgrading 
within the constraints of global production structures are significant.  Strategic policy decisions 
made by political and economic elites have had an important influence on indigenous 
technological upgrading in Southeast Asia.  The significance of such decisions is reflected in the 
ways in which the three countries explored in this paper – Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand – 
differ with regard to indigenous technological capacities.  
 
With the exception of the Philippines, all of the market-based Southeast Asian countries were 
included in the World Bank’s “High Performing Asian Economies” (HPAE) along with the 
Northeast Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (World Bank 1993).  Yet these countries 
pursued different degrees of autonomy through different kinds of technological trajectories. Each 
trajectory involved varying degrees of protection for indigenous firms and efforts to promote and 
diffuse indigenous technology.2  And each trajectory implied both varying degrees of sector 
specificity in policy and different levels of institutional challenges.  Finally, each set of policies 
and institutions reflected and reinforced a set of political arrangements.  
 
Shifts in global production structures are raising the bar for sustained growth in two ways.  First, 
growth now requires a greater emphasis on technological upgrading, especially for the market-
based countries of Southeast Asia who can no longer rely on cheap labor to attract new 
investment.  Second, in the past, developing countries could pursue more purely techno-
nationalist development strategies where upgrading of indigenous firms could occur through 
various types of “hot-house” modes prior to exposure to global competition3, and where 
absorption and diffusion of technology could be carefully managed over substantial periods of 
time.   Now, protectionist options have diminished while technological pressures have steadily 
increased.  Upgrading increasingly requires a more techno-globalist approach wherein firms 
become an active, indeed a proactive cog in a globalized production network.  Autonomy 
requires that countries be able to garner and maintain new rents in globalized value chains 
(Kaplinsky 1999; Gereffi and Tam 1998).   
 
                                                          
2 For useful reviews of differences among the NICs, see Wong (2000); Noble  (1998); Chu Yun-han (complete cite). 
3  Greg Felker suggests two “traditional” approaches.  One is to follow comparative advantage-type sectoral 
development, whether or not the state led or followed shifting comparative advantage.   This typically involved ISI 
followed by EOI in consumer goods, ISI followed by EOI in intermediates, etc. (Gereffy and Wyman 1990) A 
second approach was the “reverse product life-cycle” in which firms entered advanced industries, but in mature 
product segments, then attempted to close the gap by entering production sooner and sooner in the product cycle 
(e.g. Hobday 19..)  (Personal communication, Felker, August 2000).   
1 
 This does not deny the importance of openness and macroeconomic stability.  But it highlights 
the need for a combination of generic and sector-specific policies that not only regulate markets 
but also promote them.  Concretely, this translates into an active focus on the promotion of 
indigenous suppliers and technical personnel.   But in dynamic industries, such policies involve 
extensive transaction costs, principal agent problems, collective action dilemmas, and 
distributional difficulties.  As such, their implementation requires strong local institutions and 
political supports.  In our view, these policies and institutional capacities have been evident in 
Taiwan, but especially in the Singapore government’s “facilitation of MNC-induced 
technological learning” (Wong and Ng 2000: 17). 
 
This concept of “MNC-induced technological learning” implies a hybrid of technonationalism 
and technoglobalism based both on ends and means.  With regard to ends, nationalism can be 
understood as an effort to increase autonomy by capturing new rents within globalized value 
chains.  Such ends require the nationalist means of promoting indigenous firms and diffusing 
technology through indigenous personnel.  But indigenous promotion and diffusion can occur 
through the medium of foreign firms induced to operate in the local economy in part by attractive 
financial incentives but also by the availability of capable firms and personnel.  (See chapter by 
Doug Fuller in this volume.)  As John Dunning has noted, the creation of strong local capacities 
helps foreign producers to make better use of their own assets (1998).4   
 
This argument carries a certain irony:  Effective participation in a clearly more globalized 
production structure requires a more developed set of local institutional strengths.   If there is 
pressure for convergence, it is towards enhanced local capacities that go well beyond what has 
been called the “second Washington consensus” on the importance of open trade and investment 
regimes, macroeconomic stability, and secure institutions such as property rights, corporate 
governance and financial regulation (Burki and Perry 1998).    However, owing to institutional 
histories and a range of political factors, some will succeed in developing such capabilities, 
others will not.   
 
We explore these arguments through a cross-national examination of the hard disk drive (HDD) 
industry in three Southeast Asian countries – Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand.  The disk drive 
industry exhibits, albeit in a relatively extreme way, the pressures for high quality, low price, and 
rapid delivery within international production networks increasingly evident in other industries.  
Indeed, the CEO of one of the industry’s leading firms calls disk drive production the “extreme 
sport” of manufacturing.5   If there is any industry in which the benefits of local technological 
activism within global networks should be obvious, it is hard drives.  Singapore, Malaysia and 
Thailand have been the center of global disk drive production since the 1980s.6  For each nation, 
the industry has become a key source of economic growth.  Yet if each of the three has clearly 
succeeded in the industry, Singapore occupies a higher and, we suggest, more sustainable rung 
                                                          
4  This model of “MNC-induced technological learning” differs in important ways from the Japanese experience.  It 
does not involve efforts to replace MNCs or to position indigenous producers at the top of a value chain.   And 
although Singapore is quite picky about the foreign firms it encourages to operate within the city-state, those firms 
have much more leeway in their operations than was traditionally the case in Japan. 
5  Comments of Steve Luczo, CEO, Seagate Technologies, Stanford Graduate School of Business, November 1999, 
cited in MDH (2000: Chapter 2). 
6  Indeed, there is strong evidence that their combined attributes constitute an important source of the industry’s 
growth and the dominance of U.S. producers (Mckendrick, Doner and Haggard [MDH hereafter]  2000 ). 
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 on the technological ladder than do Malaysia and Thailand.  This is due to Singapore’s 
conception of autonomy as the capacity for constant movement up and across value chains, a set 
of market-based industrial policies designed to overcome key market failures, and a concomitant 
set of institutional attributes.  Neither Thailand nor Malaysia approaches Singapore’s 
technological objectives and institutional capacity for implementation. 
 
But if the disk drive industry is so demanding, how have Thailand and Malaysia done so well in 
it? Regional spillovers and generic policy convergence have been key.  Malaysia and Thailand 
expanded as open, stable and proximate locations for more labor-and less skill-intensive 
activities no longer feasible in Singapore.  But these two countries were not simply export 
platforms for the low-end activities of disk drive producers.  Agglomeration economies, in the 
form of pools of technical personnel and suppliers critical to the industry’s dynamic 
performance, have emerged in both countries.  These agglomerations are largely the result of 
corporate initiatives and externalities rather than Singapore-like public policies, although such 
policies have been somewhat evident in Malaysia’s Penang. 
 
The Malaysian and Thai cases thus imply that even the hard disk drive industry has room for 
countries lacking the interest and capacity for upgrading.  But they also suggest limits to such 
room.  Although the 1997 crisis did not significantly hit the hard drive industry, disk drive 
producers have moved to consolidate operations in the past five years into the lowest cost and 
most efficient sites.  As evidenced by Seagate’s reduction of its Thai workforce from over 
70,000 to less than 35,000 workers in the past three years, and a concomitant reduction of its 
Malaysian workforce by almost half, there is no guarantee that the industry will continue to 
generate the jobs and foreign exchange it has in the past. 
 
In addition, there is evidence that disk drive production in these two countries occupies a sort of 
enclave, providing few spillovers in terms of indigenous suppliers and technology development.  
The 1997 financial crisis highlighted just such weaknesses in the “real” economiesdeclining 
terms of trade, overcapacity and lack of value addedas well as the more publicized problems in 
the financial realm.   In the case of Thailand and Malaysia, these reflected technological 
weaknesses (Lall, 1998).    However, technological reform responses to the crisis have 
variedstrong and effective in Singapore, extensive but not necessarily effective in Thailand, 
and relatively weak in Malaysia. 
 
In the following section we review shifting pressures in the external context, with an emphasis 
on challenges of the hard disk drive industry.  Section II assesses the three Southeast Asian 
countries’ performance in the industry, with special emphasis on the development of indigenous 
technical personnel and suppliers.    Section III reviews the objectives and policies accounting 
for cross-national performance differences prior to the crisis.  Section IV assesses the impact of 
institutional capacities on technology performance.  Section V explores the factors influencing 
policy preferences and institutional capacities.  Section VI reviews the three countries’ response 
to the 1997 crisis.  Our conclusion explores forces influencing cross-national differences in 
responses to the crisis. 
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 I.  Challenges of Globalized Production Networks 
Until the 1990s, developing country firms in a range of industries could prosper by producing 
large volumes of standardized goods at price and quality levels below world standards, often for 
protected markets.  Such a trajectory is less and less possible with liberalized trade in industries 
increasingly characterized by at least four features: reduced importance of cheap labor; final 
consumer markets that are both more fragmented and more demanding on price, quality and 
delivery; shortened product cycles; and increasingly rapid technology change.   
 
These pressures are evident even in a traditionally labor-intensive industry such as apparel.  As 
market segments have become more fragmented and shifted away from price toward style and 
quality, “...the size of production runs has steadily declined along with the time available for 
manufacturers to respond to market demand” (Winterton and Taplin 1997).  Southeast Asian 
apparel producers are now under increased pressure to improve price, quality and delivery 
through better supply chain strategies, use of new technologies and more extensive technical 
training (“Textile Exporters” 1999).    Requirements for developing countries in the automobile 
industry are also becoming much more rigorous.  As part of their shift away from production for 
protected domestic markets to global sourcing strategies, global automobile producers are 
concentrating on a smaller number of suppliers.  Such suppliers must not only be linked to final 
buyers, they must also be capable of producing and even designing components at world class 
prices, quality and delivery times.  Requirements are so stringent that some express doubts as to 
whether developing country participation in the global auto industry is worth the investment 
(Kaplinsky 1999: 24; Humphrey 1998). 
 
Such pressures are even more extreme in the disk drive industry.  Firms must confront difficult 
and dynamic technologies in both product and process.7 A disk drive is composed of a large 
numbers of highly advanced components and parts that must operate together in tolerances 
several orders or magnitude closer than those required in textile or auto manufacture.  For 
example, to store and retrieve information, the disk drive’s “read/write head” must move rapidly 
over a disk at a distance less than the thickness of oil on a person’s skin while the disk is 
spinning at up to 15,000 rpm.  Industry experts compare positioning the head over the disk to 
flying a Boeing 747 .025 inches above the ground while maintaining a course of flight directly 
over the center-dividing stripe on a road .   These kinds of high speeds and almost unimaginably 
close tolerances indicate the daunting challenges of disk drive manufacture.   For example, just a 
few specks of dust can cause the heads to touch the surface.  If this impact is too severe, they will 
“crash,” resulting in damage to the heads or data surface, lost data, and, in the most extreme 
cases, destruction of the drive.   In addition, disk drive firms must contend with continuing 
pressures for price cuts from computer makers and with product cycles of less than a year.  
Failure to move large numbers of specific models to market precisely when buyers want them 
results in major losses.  Successful firms are those capable of reducing costs, increasing yields, 
bringing out new products, and getting those products to market in high volumes just when they 
are in demand. 
 
Given these kinds of demands, how have Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand succeeded in 
becoming key disk drive manufacturing sites?  
                                                          
7  For a review of  disk drive components and technology, see MDH (2000: Chapter 2). 
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II.  Different National Capacities Constitute One Regional Industry  
By the late 1990s, Southeast Asia – especially Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand - accounted for 
roughly two thirds of global disk drive production.8   Foreign, mostly U.S., firms accounted for 
almost all HDD shipments and most major components such as read/write heads, disk media, and 
motors.  But if foreign producers dominate the industry, its growth and the success of U.S. firms 
in particular owe much to the “location-specific” assets found and developed in Southeast Asia.   
This is a regional as well as a national story. 
 
Over time, the region came to constitute a network that offered two important advantages.  First, 
assets found in different countries allowed firms to build redundancy into their production.  
Geographic redundancy in suppliers, managers and technical personnel mitigated risks linked to 
exchange rates or other cost changes, labor shortages or plant-level problems in production.  
Redundancy allowed the industry to raise or lower production in specific locations depending on 
changing requirements.   
 
Second and more critical for our purposes were gains from trade among differently endowed 
production sites (again, facilitated by common adherence to open trade and investment regimes).  
Southeast Asia provided a proximate heterogeneity of locational assets that gave foreign firms a 
portfolio of cross-national investment sites to meet shifting production needs.  This portfolio 
includes skill-intensive, specialized services such as process engineering, clean room services, 
product testing and failure analysis; sophisticated technology- and capital-intensive production 
processes such as disk sputtering or ion milling of recording heads; specialized and precision 
metalworking such as casting, surface treatment and machining; routine but still-advanced high-
volume manufacturing of products such as printed circuit boards; and labor intensive 
subassemblies and final assembly of drives.   
 
The heterogeneous nature of this network highlights the national part of our story.  This range of 
capacities is spread across the region roughly in line with national levels of development.  
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand have all developed agglomeration economies of pools of 
technical labor and specialized suppliers.  But Singapore is clearly more developed than its two 
neighbors.   As the core of more skill-intensive operations and decision-making, Singapore has 
led the industry, accounting for 45-50 percent of global HDD shipments between 1986 and 1996.  
Qualitatively, the city-state is also dominant as the leader in regional administration, process 
engineering, and product engineering.  Historically, Singapore facilities ramped up and debugged 
drives developed in the United States and then handed the product off to Thailand or Malaysia. 
Seagate’s Singapore facilities are the site of the first disk drive designed in Southeast Asia (the 
U-4).  Singapore is also the production center for the industry’s highest-performance 
productsthe high-end server drives manufactured by Seagate and IBM.  Thailand is the core of 
motor production, heads assembly, and the assembly of notebook or mobile drives.  Malaysia 
straddles the two, mixing drive assembly, media production, heads machining and printed circuit 
                                                          
8  The U.S. accounted for 4.6%, Japan 15.5%, “other Asia” (mostly s. Korea) 5.7%, and Europe 10% (Gourevitch, 
Bohn and McKendrick 1997).  Unless noted, the rest of this review of this review is drawn from MDH (2000), 
especially Chapter 6. 
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 board assembly.9  This hierarchy is far from rigid.  For example, Thai and Malaysian facilities 
now ramp up products directly from the U.S. and Japan rather than receiving mature products for 
their end-of-life manufacture.  And both Thai and Malaysian facilities support drive facilities in 
China.  But overall, Singapore remains at the apex of this system. 
 
It does so in part by virtue of its pool of its indigenous technical personnel.  Consider the 
manufacturing requirements for high-end server drives, produced only in Singapore.10   The 
complexity of these drives means that their assembly demands more technical support for 
equipment in areas such as head positioning and head-disk assembly. In addition, the greater 
number of components, the more complex electronics, and greater variation in interfaces expand 
the possible sources of failure.   Conducting failure analysis consequently requires that engineers 
understand how a drive works as well as how to produce it.  Finally, server drives require a range 
of other specialized skills, such as development of advanced error correction code algorithms. 
Singapore’s engineering capabilities in all of these areas exceed those of any other country in the 
region.  
 
Singapore’s position at the apex of the regional hierarchy is also a function of the best-developed 
cluster of suppliers, numbering over one hundred firms.  Certainly, many of these firms are 
foreign, especially in the more complex areas of read/write heads, disk media, and spindle 
motors.  But the number of indigenous suppliers is significant.  Local producers dominate in the 
key area of precision engineering services (machining, metal stamping, surface treatment, die 
casting), as well as in cleanroom design, and printed circuit board assembly (PCBA).  Three 
local PCBA firms now rank among the global top ten electronic contract manufacturers.  And 
several local precision engineering firms have expanded to Malaysia and China along with their 
final customers. 
 
Disk drive production has expanded significantly in Malaysia and Thailand in part due to 
spillovers from neighboring Singapore.  Numerous foreign disk drive firms opted to move 
operations out of Singapore for reasons of labor costs and availability.  However, Malaysia and 
Thailand each developed their own agglomeration economies, albeit not nearly so extensive as 
Singapore’s.  Malaysia, especially the state of Penang, offered a growing pool of technical 
personnel that facilitated initial transfer of operations from Singapore and allowed joint problem 
solving between the two production sites.  Over time, local expertise allowed Penang to 
undertake functions previously monopolized by Singapore.  Seagate’s Penang facility, for 
example, served as a stand-alone production facility for certain products and functioned as a 
transfer point for China.  Implementing this strategy required the creation of a New Product 
Introduction Center.  And while yields in Seagate’s China facilities were actually higher than 
                                                          
9 Malaysia’s median position is deteriorating, however. With the closure of Seagate’s Ipoh plant, only the Kedai 
plant manufactures drives. The remaining plant in Penang manufactures head gimble assemblies. Most of Seagate’s 
low-end drives are manufactured in China while the mid- to high-end drives are manufactured in Singapore. 
10  Server drives “are an order of magnitude more complex to make than are drives of an earlier generation: they 
have more disks, more heads, more complex electronics, greater variation in interfaces, and consequently lower 
yields.  The coordination challenges are also more demanding.  High-end server customers demand a small lot and 
different interface configurations, and components have less commonality.  Because customers also pay a premium 
for these drives, they are even more demanding about service and delivery times” (MDH 2000: Chapter 7, p. 167 
[written with Wong Poh-kam]).  
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 those in Penang, this was because the Penang engineering team, trained by Seagate expatriates, 
had already performed substantial failure analysis and debugging.11  
 
A group of indigenous suppliers also developed in Penang, although not as broad or deep as 
Singapore’s.  Some of these firms were joint ventures with Singapore component producers who 
had moved to Malaysia.  But many were local firms who had gotten their start in other 
electronics segments and used their engineering, design and production capacities to diversify 
into the disk drive industry.  For example, several local firms played a growing role in line 
modification, tooling and automation for Komag, a U.S. media producer (MDH 2000: Ch. 9). 
 
Thailand’s strengths lay largely in its pool of technical personnel.  One measure of these 
strengths is the accumulation of local expertise within disk drive producer Seagate, the country’s 
largest employer.  As of 1999, Seagate employed 33,000 people of whom all but10 were Thai 
nationals.12  Seagate’s newest facility in Northeast Thailand has only a few permanently assigned 
expatriates out of some 8,000 regular employees.  Yet there are clear limits to the depth of Thai 
technical personnel.  One producer of very high precision parts was forced to recruit the core of 
its new tool and die shop from a training institute in India after failing to find sufficiently 
qualified Thai machinists.  The situation is considerably bleaker with regard to indigenous 
suppliers.  As of summer 1999, a survey of disk drive producers, component and service 
providers turned up very few indigenous firms (and these were found largely in low value added 
areas).  
 
III.  Goals and Policies  
In this section we explore the roots of the region’s disk drive-related hierarchy of capacities 
discussed above.  We begin by assessing cross-national variation in capacities in light of the 
three countries’ broader goals in high-tech industries.13  We then examine the policies through 
which these objectives have been pursued.   
 
Goals / Performance:  
Acknowledging the vast literature on economic development, we can think of three different 
kinds of economic growth – static efficiency, structural change, and upgrading — each of which 
translates into an approach to high-tech industries.   Static efficiency involves maintaining 
productivity while expanding profitability and capacity utilization in an existing product range 
and/or economic role.14  Structural change refers to intra- and intersectoral changes, including 
                                                          
11 See MDH (2000: Chapter 9), which also provides other examples. 
12  This does not include expatriate employees temporarily assigned to Thailand for specific problems or new 
product launches.   
13 Countries of course vary with regard to their emphasis on high-tech sectors.  Certainly Singapore is most 
aggressive in this regard, Thailand the least, and Malaysia in the middle.  We are grateful to Greg Felker for 
emphasizing this point. 
14  Economic roles refer to activities characterized by specific bundles of goods and services.  One useful 
categorization of economic roles involves a continuum of activities ranging from assembly, to assembly and testing, 
to OEM (original equipment manufacture) production, to ODM (original design manufacture), to OBM (original 
brand manufacture).  Role differences “imply different kinds of linkages to tangible inputs and intangible services” 
(Gereffi 2001: 3).  
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 shifts from agriculture to manufacturing, diversification within agriculture and/or manufacturing, 
expansion from downstream products to upstream intermediates and capital goods, and moves 
from labor-intensive manufacturing to more capital-and technology-intensive production.   In 
terms of high-tech industries, structural change tends to be extensive in the sense of vertically 
expanding or integrating the value-chain within the national boundaries.   
 
By contrast, what we are calling upgrading is more intensive, referring to the capacity for 
efficient use of new investments in order to generate higher value added.   At one level, 
upgrading is indicated by firms’ capacity to reduce prices, increase quality and shorten delivery 
times not simply through increased inputs but through more productive use of such inputs.  A 
key indicator is thus total factor productivity.  At another level, upgrading is indicated by the 
capacity to move within a value chain into more sophisticated products and economic activities, 
e.g. from simple assembly, to original equipment manufacturing (OEM), to original brand 
manufacturing (OBM) to original design manufacturing (ODM).15   These shifts in turn require 
capacities in areas such as research, product development and design, and marketing. 
 
Upgrading requires the ability to promote inter-sectoral linkages and to develop technology.   
The former refers not simply to the creation and coexistence of upstream and downstream 
sectors, but to dynamic complementarities in which upstream firms supply higher quality and 
cheaper inputs that promote the competitiveness of downstream producers (e.g. Gore 2000: 797).  
Technological development, although a vast topic, can be understood through three dimensions 
(Felker and Weiss 1995): Deepening – the capacity to perform progressively more demanding 
functions related to the production process (e.g. maintenance, quality control, product 
development, equipment design); Proximity – the distance to an industry’s most productive or 
sophisticated technology; and Indigenization – the degree to which local personnel have 
mastered production, management, design and innovative tasks. 
 
Although for clarity’s sake we have characterized the three types of economic growth as 
functioning distinctly and separately from one another, in reality there is significant overlap and 
fuzziness among them. It may be helpful to consider the types of growth as occupying points 
along a continuum of technological progress and development with static efficiency at the low 
end, structural change toward the upper middle, and upgrading requiring the most intensive 
levels of technological change and innovation. It is clear from this conception that multiple types 
of growth may be functioning simultaneously within the same economy, indeed, the same 
industry. 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of inherent overlap, these categories are useful for characterizing the core 
objectives of the three countries under study.   In high technology, Thailand tends toward static 
efficiency objectives within a structural shift to upstream and high technology sectors.   From 
1985 to 1993, medium-high technology manufactured goods such as computer parts, electronics, 
and electronic appliances, grew at 30 percent whereas the growth of more labor-intensive 
products such as garments slowed to an average of 14 percent.  By 1995, exports of medium-
high tech products were roughly 40 percent greater than labor-intensive products (Chalongpop 
1997: 7).   But by 1996, exports stagnated and the current account deficit reached 8 percent.   In 
                                                          
15  Gereffi and Tam (1998: 8), from which our discussion of upgrading is adapted and modified. 
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 one short decade Thailand had lost its comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufactured 
goods.   
 
The country’s lack of ability to manufacture as opposed to assemble medium-high technology 
products was becoming obvious.  In a 1998 study, Lall concluded that, despite its intensive 
growth during the 1980s, Thailand’s export structure was closer to that of the Philippines than 
Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea or even Malaysia.   And while the Thai export structure was 
more advanced than that of China or Indonesia,  “it is not evident that Thailand is operating at 
much higher technological levels in the production process” (1998: 4).   Indeed, the World Bank 
has emphasized the “rapid reduction in the growth rate of total factor productivity since the late 
1980s, and strikingly low levels of R&D in the private sector, one of the lowest in the region as a 
proportion of GDP” (2000: 42-43).16 
 
Thailand had remained an assembly platform whose cost advantage was likely to prove as 
temporary as its success in lower-technology exports.   The underlying problem was Thailand’s 
weak engineering base.  The country’s ability to absorb new technologies and to raise the 
capacities of indigenous firms was “far more limited than it was in the newly industrialized 
countries at a similar stage in their development.” Thailand’s more sophisticated manufactured 
exports came from foreign, not domestic firms; the latter are well protected, heavily oriented to 
the domestic market, and have much lower technical capabilities (Coloco 1998: 12-14).    In 
sum, Thailand is characterized by a de-linked dualism in which a foreign-dominated, 
technologically-rich export sector functions alongside, but is largely detached from, the 
indigenous, technology-poor, import-competing sector (Nipon and Fuller 1997; Nipon and 
Pawadee 1998; Felker 1998).  
 
Like Thailand, Malaysia has undergone an impressive structural transformation. Between 1971 
and 1993 the manufacturing share of GDP rose from 14 percent to 30.1 percent. In dollars, 
manufactured exports rose from $122 million in 1970 to US$2.3 billion in 1980 to $US 20.7 
billion in 1991 and then doubled again to US$42 billion by 1994. The annual rate of growth over 
this period was 27.7 percent per year. The highest growth was recorded between 1970 and 1980 
when exports grew at 34.2 percent (Lall, 1999:153). 
 
In addition to promoting structural shifts, Malaysia has placed greater emphasis on technological 
upgrading than has Thailand. Lall (1999) characterizes this emphasis as shifting from light (easy, 
traditional) to heavy (complex, capital-intensive) activities. During the 1980s the pace of 
industrial deepening accelerated as exports of semiconductors were quickly followed by 
electricals and electronics exports. By 1990 Malaysia was far ahead of Thailand with an 
advanced industrial structure only marginally lower than for both Korea and Taiwan. With 
regard to electricals and electronics, Malaysia’s industrial structure was higher even than most 
OECD countries (Lall, 1999:151-152). 
 
Nevertheless, these statistics do not reveal the underlying weakness of the Malaysian industrial 
structure. First, much of the advanced electrical and electronics industries is concentrated in final 
                                                          
16  There is of course extensive controversy on TFP estimates.  Wong’s review finds a consistent pattern of higher 
values for the Asian NICs than for the ASEAN-4, but notes that Thailand seems to be an exception in some of the 
studies (2000: 11). 
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 assembly, incorporating little in the way of design, development and other advanced technical 
and marketing skills. Second, many heavy industries in Malaysia depend on imported 
components and have very few local supply linkages. Third, the industrial structure lacks local 
capital-goods industry, which could seriously hinder the machinery-manufacturing sector, 
normally considered the “hub” of technological diffusion and progress. Fourth, like Thailand, 
Malaysia is characterized by a strong dualism. That is, the large numbers of SMEs, which 
comprise the majority of industrial employment, are effectively disconnected from the high-
technology production structure geared to export or to heavy industry (Lall, 1999:153). 
 
Unlike Thailand, however, by the 1990s Malaysia had developed a core of firms that specialize 
in technologically advanced electronic processes and products, such as highly-advanced thin-
film disk manufacture and semiconductor testing and assembly (Hobday, 1999:100). Moreover, 
Hobday argues that a new group of fast-growing, large local firms are beginning to compete 
technologically in the world export market. (1999:82).  The most impressive developments, 
however have occurred in Penang.  There, dynamic backward linkages from foreign 
semiconductor assemblers have generated a strong set of indigenous machine tool firms, several 
of whom have gone on to produce for the disk drive industry (Rasiah 2000/forthcoming).  As we 
shall see, this is an exception that proves the importance of institutions and politics. 
 
Singapore conforms most closely to the upgrading ideal.  While the economy grew at an average 
annual rate of 8.3 percent during the 1960-98 period, manufacturing expanded at an even faster 
rate of 9.9 percent.  Along with this expansion, technological upgrading in manufacturing has 
been impressive.  From roughly half the OECD average in 1980, Singapore’s labor productivity 
almost equaled OECD levels in 1994 and exceeded levels of the other Asian newly industrialized 
countries (Wong 2000: 15).   These achievements are qualified by Singapore’s extensive reliance 
on foreign firms for the bulk of manufacturing output.   The foreign presence is especially high 
in electronics where majority foreign-owned firms accounted for 56 percent of the number of 
firms and foreign equity accounted for 85 percent of the industry’s total capital (Ibid., p. 33).  
Yet unlike Thailand and Malaysia (with the Penang exception), the presence of foreign firms has 
stimulated the emergence of indigenous electronics producers and related suppliers, at least 30 of 
which had annual sales of $100 million or more in 1997.  Many of these firms were founded by 
former MNC employees and, unlike their Thai counterparts, all must face global competition 
since Singapore provides no protection against foreign competition (Ibid.) 
 
Policies: 
It is often difficult to determine whether cross-national differences in growth outcomes reflect 
variation in goals and preference intensities or in the ability to implement policies designed to 
achieve those goals.  Comparing policies can shed light on the relative weight of goals and 
preferences since, at a minimum, the absence of upgrading-related policies suggests a lack of 
attention to such objectives.  The three countries under study converged on generic, sector-
neutral policies, reflecting their common belief that FDI was critical for economic growth.  With 
regard to high-tech exporting industries such as disk drives, each was characterized by free labor 
market policies, free trade regimes, solid physical infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, an 
open investment regime (full ownership rights, absence of local content or export requirements), 
and highly attractive incentives, especially tax exemptions (MDH 2000: Chapter 10).   
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 The three countries did differ on the degree to which they even formulated policies designed to 
promote indigenous capacities in high technology, especially electronics, and in the disk drive 
industry in particular.   Our overall argument is that, prior to the 1997 crisis, Thailand’s 
leadership was simply not that concerned with upgrading.  Malaysia, in contrast, has paid 
systematic attention to upgrading and technology issues.  But the intensity of this attention was 
offset by other, more redistributive concerns.   Singapore’s policy focus on technology has been 
the most systematic as redistributive concerns jived with efficiency goals.  
 
A 1996 report concluded that Thailand’s science and technology environment “was characterized 
by mismatches in S&T human resource supply, very low levels of R&D activity, a private sector 
with strong manufacturing capability but weak research, development and engineering 
capability, and an information technology that is growing but remains insufficient” (Brooker 
1996: 96).   This state of affairs is in large part a function of a policy regime and underlying set 
of beliefs that autonomy does not require extensive upgrading and technology development.  The 
policy emphasis has been on quantitative growth in jobs and exports, often relying on cheap 
labor and/or protection.  A Thai quality assurance director at one drive firm (Micropolis) 
summed up the impact of public policies in stating that Thai government incentives “are for 
investors, not technology developers.” A Chinese manager at another firm (Magnecomp) said 
that when he worked in Hong Kong, his main focus was on engineering issues. In Thailand, he 
spent most of his time on personnel and regulatory issues.17   
 
These weaknesses are evident in human resource development, local vendor/supplier 
development, and technology diffusion and absorption.  Thailand’s skill development efforts are 
notoriously weak.  The country’s rapid economic growth since the mid-1980s resulted in 
significant shortages of technical personnel.  The government responded in the 1990s with a 
skills development program based on a Singapore program and a set of tax exemption programs.  
In addition to fragmented implementation (see below), neither of these was designed in close 
consultation with representatives from electronics or disk drive firms.  A striking illustration of 
the government’s lack of attention to human resource issues is that relevant officials showed no 
awareness of a certification program in basic disk drive competence initiated in Singapore by the 
International Disk Drive Equipment and Materials Association, until notified by foreign 
researchers (author interviews).  
 
Thailand’s weak supplier base reflects tariff and tax policies that discouraged subcontracting 
between foreign exporters and local producers, and vendor development programs that did little 
to support indigenous suppliers.   Until the early 1990s, export-oriented reforms were grafted on 
to protection for local firms producing for the domestic market and effectively discouraged them 
from supplying exporting firms.  Tariff protection for upstream investors raised the costs of 
downstream firms using such inputs.   Exporting firms, such as Seagate, could of course avoid 
these costs by importing cheaper inputs and obtaining duty rebates or not paying any tariffs by 
locating outside of congested Bangkok.   But for indirect exporters, i.e. firms producing in 
                                                          
17  Unless otherwise noted, this policy review draws directly from Doner and Brimble (1999: 
Section III). 
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 Thailand for sale to final exporters, the burden was heavy.18   Reinforcing these tariff policies 
were a series of levies that encouraged vertical integration by exporters.19 
 
In addition, Thailand’s vendor development programs were close to nonexistent until the late 
1990s.  A 1990 report found that Sharp and Seagate had tried but failed to find even simple metal 
and plastic injection molded components from local firms (Dahlman and Brimble 1990).  Other 
firms in the disk drive industry (IBM, Fujitsu, ADFlex, and Nidec) also failed to find suppliers 
for more complex tools. The lack of a supplier base also become a concern since the influx of 
FDI in the late 1980s had expanded the current account deficit to 8.5 percent of GDP in 1990. 
(Lauridsen 1999: 3). After a half-hearted effort to impose stronger local content criteria on new 
foreign investments in 1991, the Thailand Board of Investment initiated a non-incentive-based 
vendor development program to encourage technology diffusion and subcontracting linkages 
between MNCs and local suppliers - the BoI Unit for Industrial Linkage Development program 
(BUILD).  Despite positive responses from long-established firms such as Minibea, the program 
basically faded, even after it was upgraded to a “National Supplier Development Program” 
involving all major agencies responsible for small and medium-enterprise development.  Part of 
the problem was the government’s general neglect and ignorance of the country’s small and 
medium sized enterprises.  Indeed, government agencies could not even agree on a basic 
definition of SMEs until the financial crisis of 1997.  (Sevilla and Kusol 2000). 
 
Thailand also paid insufficient attention to technology diffusion and absorption.  The investment 
regime has contributed little to technology promotion. Led by the board of Investments, it has 
tended to ignore what might be called the “quality” of investments. Instead of focusing on the 
potential for technological spillovers, the BOI emphasized numbers of firms promoted, the 
financial value of promoted investment, and numbers of jobs generated (e.g. Westphal et al 
1990: 123).  Institutions explicitly devoted to technology promotion have been weak and 
fragmented.   The lack of linkages between universities and industry has been a concern for 
several years (Brooker 1996), resulting in the loss of opportunities to diffuse and commercialize 
useful innovations.20  Thailand has also been weak in both direct and indirect provision of 
diffusion-oriented technical services.  Despite efforts to consolidate since the mid-1980s, 
Thailand’s industrial standards agency has been unable to move quickly to establish mutual 
recognition agreements with standards authorities in major export markets. There have also been 
                                                          
18 To remedy this problem, the government extended duty offsets to indirect exporters in the late 1980s. But despite 
progress, significant delays in document processes, leading to delays in rebates and added costs for imported raw 
materials, continued to occur.  This resulted in significant cost for local SMEs, but even for foreign-owned suppliers 
operating in Thailand.   One Thai-based supplier of wire to Seagate’s Thai facilities regularly sent its product to 
Singapore and then re-exported it back to Thailand the same day due to avoid the paperwork and related delays 
involved in tariff rebates for indirect exporters (author interviews).   
19  Examples include a business tax that imposed a higher burden on inter-firm subcontracting than in-house 
production. This was replaced by a VAT tax in 1992, but the refund for exporters remains a slow process.  
20 A disk drive engineer in Bangkok contrasted the Thai situation with a case in Singapore involving the 
development of head cleaning technology. Read-Rite uses a water-based process which obviously can introduce 
impurities. While in Singapore, this engineer learned of laser-based cleaning equipment developed by NUS 
researchers. But the researchers were not able to make the shift from equipment that would clean a few heads to 
those cleaning millions. With support from Japanese investors, a spin-off resulted that did develop higher volume 
equipment. Fujitsu is reportedly using the equipment and RR is considering it (author interview, Read-Write). 
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 problems with regard to testing laboratories and services, despite requests for an expansion of 
such services from both local and foreign firms. 21 
 
Thailand’s inattention to high technology is reflected in the electronics industry.  As late as 1997, 
an individual with over 20 years experience in Silicon Valley, said that "the industry was 
confused by the government's policies" and that Thai governments "had never had firm policies 
to develop the electronics industry despite its high potential” (Yuthana 1997).    
 
In contrast to the Thai case, Malaysia’s weaknesses are not a function of public neglect of 
technology and upgrading.  Beginning in the 1980s, science and technology policy became 
“progressively more institutionalized and integral to government development planning.”22  An 
Industrial Master Plan and Technology Action plan provided detailed surveys of the technical 
strengths and weaknesses of specific sectors and targeted several technology priority areas: 
electronics, biotechnology, information technology, advanced materials and automated 
manufacturing.   
 
As early as the 1980s, Malaysia began to address shortages of technical personnel.  After a 
disappointing response to a double tax deduction for training expenditures (1986), the 
government created a Human Resources Development Fund – an industry sector-wide payroll 
levy and subsidy scheme in the early 1990s modeled on Singapore’s Skill Development Fund.  
Moreover, in the early 1990’s, the government initiated reform efforts in higher education.  
These included an expansion of science and technology programs, permission for foreign 
universities to open Malaysian branch campuses, speeding the entry of engineering graduates 
into the workforce, and encouraging the state-owned telecommunication firm to set up a degree-
granting institution.  In a further effort to promote university-industry linkages, the government 
launched a project in 1997 to create a Malaysian Science and Technology University with 
assistance from the M.I.T.  
 
In vocational education, weaknesses in initiatives such as a National Apprentice Scheme and a 
Trade Skill Certification Course prompted a shift to joint ventures with the French, German and 
Japanese governments to set up technical training institutes, and the encouragement of industry-
operated skills development centers modeled on the successful Penang Skills Development 
Centre (PSDC).  Penang’s efforts merit special note since they began earlier and have been more 
successful than any other Malaysian training effort.  The PSDC was essentially a local initiative 
whose success drew the attention of the Malaysian Federal government.  In 1994, the 
government encouraged other states to emulate the PSDC model.  
 
Yet in the final analysis, the return on these initiatives has been less than stellar. First, of the 
funds contributed to the Human Resource Development Fund (HRDF), less than half were 
claimed for training expenses. Also troubling, only a tiny fraction of SMEs have registered with 
the HRDC or participate in its programs. Second, fragmentation and duplication are rife among 
university and vocational education institutions, at both state and federal levels.  The lack of 
                                                          
21 In 1987, Thailand’s peak business association urged the government’s major lab to accredit private 
laboratories to perform testing services, but only 25 firms were accredited by 1994 (Felker 1998).  
 
22 Felker (1999: 11), from which, unless otherwise noted, this review of Malaysian policy is drawn.  
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 qualified instructors has been a clear impediment, especially for technical and engineering 
subjects. Third, linkages between academia and training institutes and the private sector remain 
scarce. Training centers established on the PSDC model have yet to achieve the same level of 
private firm participation as in Penang. Finally, as the economy shows signs of recovering, 
promising initiatives have lost government interest and support and faded away. For example, 
the effort to create the Malaysian Science and Technology University with MIT’s help has been 
abandoned in favor of other initiatives.23 
 
Malaysia also initiated ambitious programs as early as 1988 to promote subcontracting links 
between indigenous and foreign firms.  The first program was a vendor-development effort, 
initiated by the government-owned auto firm Proton, to bring indigenous Malay (Bumiputera) 
suppliers into the formerly exclusively ethnic-Chinese autoparts industry. This was expanded in 
1993 to the Vendor Development Programme through which large local firms and MNCs, in 
cooperation with state agencies and local banks, would help local firms with technical assistance, 
subsidized finance and procurement contracts.  Over 50 foreign firms signed on as “anchor 
companies,” with the electrical/electronics industries accounting for the overwhelming majority 
of companies.  Yet, as of 1995, the program had “yet to register a major impact on technology 
transfer through industrial sub-contracting networks” (Ibid. 19).  Part of the problem involved 
lack of clear performance measurements and monitoring.  Part reflected the weaknesses of the 
country’s long-standing SME-assistance schemes.  Again, however, Malaysia’s state of Penang 
stands out as the exception.  There, the Penang Development Corporation forged subcontracting 
linkages between foreign semiconductor firms and local machine tool firms resulting in a high-
tech cluster in semiconductors and, as noted earlier, in disk drives and related industries. 
 
Finally, Malaysia has been quite active in broader technology promotion and diffusion efforts.   
With regard to FDI, Malaysia traditionally eschewed any selective emphasis on high-tech 
investment.  By the early 1990s, when the lack of technology transfer was becoming evident, the 
government began to implement positive incentives, including requirements that foreign firms 
achieve certain levels of R&D expenditures and percentages of workforce composed of science 
and technical graduates (Felker 1999: 16). Yet it is unclear if these incentives have had any real 
impact; even after the crisis, levels of R&D in the foreign-dominated electrical and electronics 
sector is virtually non-existent. 24 
 
The government has also attempted to stimulate technology creation by establishing specialized 
technology parks, essentially ready-made clusters of private research facilities and technology-
intensive companies.  These began in 1988 with the Technology Park Malaysia as an incubator 
program for micro-enterprises in information technology and electronics.  It continued with the 
Kulim High-Technology Park in the northern Kedah state, a facility with specialized 
infrastructure, public research institutes, technical universities, and special lots for SMEs.  This 
facility now houses a number of disk drive and related component firms.  The most ambitious 
project is the Multimedia Super Corridor – a multi-billion dollar effort offering special facilities 
and incentives to promote the growth of information technology research and development.  All 
of these efforts were buttressed by a range of financial incentives for industrial R&D and by 
standards and productivity institutions devoted to offering special assistance for SMEs. 
                                                          
23 Author interviews in Malaysia, October 2000-January 2001. 
24 Author interview. 
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Singapore’s technology development efforts, both in general and in relation to the hard disk 
drive industry, have been both extensive and effective.  The government has emphasized both 
quality and quantity in human resources.  Given the city-state’s small population, the 
government has implemented a highly liberal and active policy of drawing on high-skilled, 
foreign personnel.  Singapore’s Economic Development Board (EDB) is surely among the few 
government investment promotion agencies to set up an International Manpower Division to 
attract foreign talent.25  The distinctly “technoglobalist” nature of this personnel policy should be 
noted.  For Singapore, if the reduction of external vulnerability requires foreign support, so be it 
(as reflected in the hiring of an expatriate to head the government Development Bank of 
Singapore).26    
 
Public policies to improve the quality of labor devoted to high technology have been the most 
substantial in the region.27   In the 1970s, the government initiated efforts in vocational training, 
efforts that expanded to include a whole range of sectors and skill levels.   The EDB established 
industrial training centers, actively seeking out foreign firms and institutions to co-sponsor 
training programs.  A Skills Development Fund based on a compulsory payroll tax was 
developed to train less-skilled workers.  Companies can use this tax only by sending workers to 
approved training programs.  Interviews with HDD producers and suppliers indicate that most if 
not all have used this program for worker training (MDH 2000: 175).  Direct public assistance 
went to workers pursuing training in specific technical skills, such as CNC machining.   And as 
required skills became more advanced, the government responded with new programs in both 
polytechnics and universities, both at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Although these do 
not necessarily target the HDD industry, these programs have expanded the reservoir of disk 
drive manufacturing process-engineering skills. 
 
Disk drive producers have also used other subsidized skill upgrading programs.  In the mid 
1990s, for example, several hard disk drive majors were using automation promotion incentives 
to adopt computer-integrated technologies and to send engineers abroad to be trained in 
advanced automation technologies.  Finally, the government has recently collaborated with 
IDEMA, the international disk drive trade association, to provide specialized certification 
training for the industry. 
 
Support for indigenous producers really developed following the recession of 1985.  Several 
precision engineering firms serving the hard disk drive industry grew through a variety of public 
financial and technical assistance programs.  The most important, at least for the hard disk drive 
industry, has been the Local Industry Upgrading Program launched by the Economic 
Development Board in 1986.  Several features of this effort have contributed to its success.  
First, the Economic Development Board pays the salary of experienced multinational managers 
who identify and work with local suppliers with competitive potential.   Second, the Local 
Industry Upgrading Program managers from different multinationals meet regularly at the 
                                                          
25  Wong and Ng (2000: 18). 
26  We are grateful to Greg Felker for this fact and for noting that when some people objected to this hiring, the 
government responded that Singapore could not afford nationalist protection.  (Personal communication). 
27  Unless noted, this review of Singapore policies is drawn from MDH (2000: Chapter 7, written with Wong Poh-
kam). 
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 Economic Development Board to combine their knowledge of problems facing local suppliers.  
In doing so, they leverage resources beyond their own firms even as they provide Economic 
Development Board officials with a full picture of supplier and multinational needs, thus 
allowing for a fine-tuning of the program.  Finally, the Local Industry Upgrading Program has 
provided valuable preferential financing.  
 
The third component of Singapore’s technology efforts involves R&D promotion.  The National 
Science and Technology Board (NSTB) has initiated a number of incentive schemes which, 
while open to foreign and local firms in and outside of the disk drive industry, have been used by 
all the disk drive majors in Singapore. Government research promotions have grown more 
extensive and more industry specific in the 1990s.  In 1992, the NSTB set up the Magnetics 
Technology Center to provide technical support to the hard disk drive industry and stimulate a 
virtuous cycle of local R&D activities.  Despite initially minimal achievements, the government 
expanded the Magnetics Technology Center into a Data Storage Institute in 1996 to cover 
technology not just in magnetic storage but also optical and other storage technologies.  The Data 
Storage Institute has a staff of 144 and an annual budget of $28 million.  Over time, it drawn disk 
drive firms into collaborative agreements, leading to several approved patents, and the 
establishment of at least one company in laser texturing of magnetic disks and laser 
microfabrication.  Finally, the government provides direct financial support for corporate R&D.  
Such funding encouraged Seagate to create a design center in 1984.  The center began doing 
design work in 1994, in part due to pressure and incentive funding from the Economic 
Development Board.  By 1997, the firm’s R&D staff grew to 140 and, in 1998, came out with the 
first disk drive designed in Southeast Asia (the low-cost U4). 
 
Until the beginning of the crisis, the Singapore government directed most of its resources to 
encourage R&D in foreign MNCs. The 1997 crisis, however, placed into stark relief the top-
heavy nature of the economy, making it apparent that small, technopreneurial firms were not 
being created in the economy.  In response, the NSTB set aside $1 billion US as seed capital to 
encourage spin-offs of indigenous technology firms from university incubators and the 13 public 
research institutes.28 
 
Several points emerge from the preceding account.  First, Singapore’s technology policies are the 
most extensive and industry specific in the region.  Second, these efforts are sustained over the 
long run, unless they are inconsistent with market performance.29   Third, the policies are based 
on serving the needs of the industry, even as they reflect an effort to anticipate the kinds of skills 
and services Singapore requires to maintain its position in the high value added portion of the 
electronics value chain.  Indeed, these policies reflect the belief that disk drives are an integral 
part of a broader electronics value chain.  Fourth, the policies are designed to induce foreign 
firms to localize high-technology functions and to root them in dense, local institutions.  Fifth, 
the policies are a reflection of Singapore’s belief that local clusters or agglomerations constitute 
the best way to retain the country’s position in electronics or any value chain. And sixth, the 
policies indicate that Singapore does not see a contradiction in pursuing national technological 
objectives through the simultaneous promotion of both local and foreign firms. As a result, these 
                                                          
28 Author interview, Singapore July 2000. 
29  In 1996, Singapore Technologies, a government-owned,  high-tech conglomerate, purchased a disk drive firm, 
Micropolis.  The acquisition was a financial disaster and was liquidated in 1998 after significant losses.  
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 policies have effectively generated not only a pool of technical expertise and reliable suppliers; 
they have also begun to generate technological spillovers among drive producers, something that 
has not (to our knowledge) occurred elsewhere in the region.30   
 
An early event in Singapore’s electronics history illustrates the country’s efforts to draw on 
foreign firms to develop local capacities.  The government recruited Rollei, a German camera 
maker with strong machining capacities, to Singapore in the 1960s.  In conjunction with the 
Economic Development Board, the firm set up an in-house precision engineering training 
institute, which succeeded in training twice as many precision engineers as Rollei needed for 
their operations in Singapore.31   When Seagate established its Singapore operation, it asked the 
Economic Development Board for help in finding local producers of basic metal parts and 
components.  Several of the suppliers were founded by Rollei alumni.  Several years later, 
Seagate’s motor division opted to set up a precision tool and die operation in Singapore in part 
because of a government-sponsored institute headed by a German formerly employed by Rollei. 
 
Preferences, reflected through policies, are not the only determinant of technology development.   
After all, Thailand and Malaysia have initiated or considered training programs patterned after 
those in Singapore.   Thailand attempted to strengthen its supporting industries as early as the 
late 1980s; Malaysia essentially copied the cluster and value-chain concept from Singapore for 
its Second Industrial Master Plan; and Penang consciously followed Singapore’s policies of  “ 
MNC-induced technological learning.”  Yet only Penang has successfully emulated Singapore’s 
achievements in using foreign producers to generate a strong local technology cluster (Doner and 
Hershberg 1999).  Explaining differential capacities for implementing similar policies suggests 
the importance of variation in institutional strengths.  
  
IV.  Institutional Capacities  
Institutional Challenges of New Industrial Policies:  
Singapore’s technology policies, viewed through the disk drive case, belie the dichotomy 
between state- and market-led policies.  They illustrated the importance of basing sectoral 
interventions on market criteria and on general openness in trade and investment regimes; they 
also suggest that sector-specific measures do not necessarily lead to the subsidies, protection and 
allocative inefficiency so often emphasized by critics of industrial policy.  Indeed, in part for 
political economy reasons, a commitment to free investment and trade policies is critical for 
sectoral measures. These policies constitute a useful monitoring mechanism to ensure that 
business-government relations do not sink into rent seeking and that firms are exposed to global 
                                                          
30 This involves mutual benchmarking as well as diffusion of process innovations.  For example (the only one we 
have at this time), a disk drive official developed a way for drives to test themselves without specialized testers.  
Despite his patenting the technique, everyone in Singapore copied it and cut the amount of time sharply from the 
previous three days (MDH 2000: 180).  
31 The firm’s decision to close its operations in 1981 was a traumatic event for Singapore, which was not used to 
such departures.  Instead of criticizing the firm, a senior government minister went on television to praise the firm 
for the skills it had developed and the toolmakers it had trained.  And in fact, several of its technicians went on to 
open their own precision engineering firms to service the new electronics MNCs. 
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 market pressures.  Protectionism and the lack of competitive pressure was one key factor in the 
failure of Brazil to sustain its early effort in disk drive production.32  
 
But as recent research suggests, openness to both foreign trade and investment are not sufficient 
for the kinds of upgrading necessary for long-term growth (Rodrik 2000; Mody 1998: 13-14; 
25).   “The trick in the successful cases has been to combine the opportunities offered by world 
markets with a domestic investment and institution-building strategy to stimulate the animal 
spirits of domestic entrepreneurs” (Ibid., 8).  But endogenous growth theory suggests that simple 
“animal spirits,” even when new technology is available “off the shelf” (rarely the case), are 
themselves insufficient to generate growth in an entire sector or economy.  This is especially true 
given the need to expand product variety, to improve product quality, and to reduce costs as 
outlined above (e.g. Romer 1990).  Traditional objectives of capital formation, job growth and 
foreign exchange earnings are thus now supplemented by efforts not just to exploit current 
relative cost advantages but also “to promote investment and learning in economic activities 
where comparative advantage can realistically be expected to lie in the immediate future as the 
economy develops and as other late industrializing countries catch up” (Gore 2000: 797).  
 
These goals require policy instruments focused on areas typically plagued by market failures: 
human resource development, technology diffusion, supplier linkages, and advanced 
infrastructure (Mody 1998; Peters 1998).   Such instruments involve a combination of sector-
specific and sector-neutral policies (Gore 2000: 797).  This combination is driven by two factors.  
First, firms typically benefit from both generic and more industry- or product-specific services in 
areas such as training or advanced infrastructure and logistics.  Second, the very definition of 
“sector” is now questioned as successful countries view their economies as sets of value chains.  
The capacity for sustained growth thus requires going beyond support for discrete industries to 
“fostering the growth of dynamic industrial ‘clusters’ of complementary assembly, component 
production, producer-services, skill-development and technology support” (Felker and Jomo 
1998: 4).   
These kinds of public policies are more difficult to implement than either sector-neutral or 
sectoral protectionist policies.  The latter can—to exaggerate only slightly—be promulgated by 
the government with the stroke of a pen (MDH 2000: Ch. 10). By contrast, the formulation and 
implementation of industry-specific policies such as training and supplier development require 
that governments directly mobilize and draw on the specialized knowledge of private actors, 
including the sharing of proprietary knowledge that can exposes firms to risks of opportunism. 
Moreover, these informational requirements are highly dynamic; policies appropriate to one 
stage of the industry's growth may not be germane at another. 33 
                                                          
32 Brazil initiated local drive production by indigenous firms before HDD investment in any other developing 
country.  For details, see MDH (2000: Chapter 10). 
33 The challenges have been captured by the New Institutional Economics literature (e.g. Clague 1997).  First, 
transaction costs – the costs of searching, bargaining and enforcing deals – increase with the number of actors 
involved, the information-intensity of policy, and the extent of policy adjustment required to meet shifting industry 
requirements over time.  Second, principal-agent problems become more acute when policymaking and 
implementation involve more layers of government and larger numbers of private actors.   Third, collective action 
problems grow with the involvement of larger numbers of actors, each of which may be tempted to “cheat” – to free 
ride on the efforts and information provided by others.  The tendency of firms to poach skilled workers from others 
rather than to contribute to training programs, whether in-house or industry-wide, is an obvious instance of such 
problems. And finally, because the resolution of differences within value chains typically results in winners and 
losers, growth-promoting measures can be undermined by distributive problems.   These can in turn contribute to 
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Such problems typically defy resolution through simple arms-length or parametric interventions 
common to generic, “baseline” policies.    They are rather “institution-intensive” (Clague 1997: 
3), requiring arrangements that facilitate information sharing, mutual monitoring, 
implementation of collective goals, and compensating losers while empowering winners.  What 
kinds of institutions?  Competition-promoting policies require enhanced rather than minimalist 
states.  Only states with expertise, flexibility and some degree of autonomy can appreciate, much 
less implement, sector-specific policies that promote private sector efficiency. But states cannot 
pursue such policies absent extensive contact with those most directly involved in the market.  
Systematic public-private consultation can improve information for public sector decisions, 
broaden ownership and enhance the credibility of such policies, improve accountability and 
transparency, and expand resources for policy implementation.  And finally, such public-private 
sector exchanges can benefit from business itself being organized (although bilateral 
consultations with specific firms may be more suitable for policies involving highly proprietary 
information). 34   
 
Variation in Institutional Capacities 
The three Southeast Asian countries differ significantly with regard to institutional capacities.  
Singapore’s ability to implement as well as to formulate effective policies is a function of a 
network of well-coordinated agencies led by the Economic Development Board.  These agencies 
benefit from strong political backing and insulation from democratic constraints by Singapore’s 
dominant party system (led by the People’s Action Party).  As a result, officials are able to 
formulate policies with a view toward longer-term objectives nested within a vision based on 
dynamic clusters of related activities.  These processes are themselves predicated on the 
assumption that the government’s role is to catalyze, not replace, the private sector.   
 
This requires monitoring of and engagement with the private sector. Government officials are 
sufficiently informed and organized to monitor and to hold firms accountable for their use of 
incentives and subsidies. The criterion of accountability is a firm or industry's capacity to 
succeed in the market.  In the case of state support for local companies in the Local Industry 
Upgrading Program, market performance is interpreted through a local firm's success in linking 
up with and supplying export-oriented, foreign firms. 
 
Such monitoring overlaps with engagement.  At the sectoral level, there is evidence of extensive 
collective engagement with business on issues of human resources, supplier development, and 
technology diffusion.   As noted, for example, the Economic Development Board actively sought 
out multinational corporations to establish industrial training centers, institutes, and programs in 
its promotion of electronics-related skills development.   Similarly, the Data Storage Institute 
(whose chair is the head of Hewlett Packard in Singapore) is also highly attentive to demands 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
time-inconsistency on the part of political leaders who, because of political reactions, might discount the future 
gains of growth-promoting measures. 
34 Business associations can help to limit the pursuit of particularistic benefits by individual firms and 
facilitate the provision of critical industry-specific information from--and among—firms.  However, the degree to 
which associations pursue such productive objectives seems to depend on their exposure to market pressures and the 
imposition of selective benefits by state officials (Doner and Schneider 2000).  
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 emanating from the industry, which has been drawn into the Institute through its governance 
structure.  In effect, the Data Storage Institute serves as a mechanism for organizing the disk 
drive industry in Singapore.  And finally, the success of the Skills Development Fund is 
predicated on close ties with organized labor (National Trade Union Congress) as well as with 
business (Ritchie, 2001). Extensive input from business has ensured that participation in the 
Skills Development Fund is high; amazingly, as of 1999, 100 percent of firms with more than ten 
employees participated.  Cooperation between labor and the Skills Development Fund has made 
it possible for the National Trade Union Congress to implement a new Skills Redevelopment 
Program using existing Skills Development Fund funds and infrastructure to train both union and 
non-union workers, avoiding costly duplication.35 
 
Thailand’s institutional capacities are distinctly weaker.  First, Thailand lacks any kind of 
politically powerful and cohesive agency focused on technological upgrading.  The country’s 
macroeconomic agencies, historically the most powerful and cohesive government bodies, 
assumed that macroeconomic stability was sufficient for growth (as indeed it was for many 
years).  Second, policy implementation is weakened by splits between the macroeconomic 
agencies and sectoral ministries as well as fragmentation among the latter.  And finally, since the 
1990s, the country’s competitive party system, driven by rural-based politicians with little 
support for industrial promotion, have politicized the sectoral ministries and further undermined 
support for industrial upgrading. 
 
These conditions have severely hindered the development of effective R&D and training 
institutions and policies. As part of the Sixth Plan (1986-1991), the government created the 
partially-autonomous Science and Technology Development Board to strengthen applied 
research in the public sector, diffuse public-sector R&D expertise to local firms, and offer direct 
support to private-sector research initiatives. Nevertheless, these objectives were undermined 
when the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment (MOSTE) created three 
technology institutes to pursue the same objectives as the STDB. Fragmentation is even more 
severe in technical training. At least seven ministries have a major role in education and training 
leading to duplication, waste, and intense bureaucratic infighting (Ritchie, 1999).36 
 
Bureaucratic rivalries have also hampered initiatives to develop public institutions devoted to 
technology acquisition and diffusion. For example, the Fifth Development Plan (1982-1986) 
called for the creation of a Public Technology Transfer Corporation. Nevertheless, the effort was 
blocked by inter-ministerial rivalry. Likewise, the Thailand Institute of Scientific and 
Technological Research (TISTR), patterned after Korea’s Advanced Institute for Science and 
Technology, foundered under a combination of bureaucratic controls and political interference 
                                                          
35  In addition, the SDF does not directly administer any funds. All fund disbursement is handled through a 
financial department in the PSB, which coordinates with the Ministry of Finance. Thus, those that distribute the 
funds do not determine where they go, and those that determine where they go do not distribute them (Author 
Interview).  
 
36 For example, both the Minstry of Education and Interior provide primary education, the Ministries of 
Education, Labor, Industry, Interior, and Agriculture all provide vocational education, and the Ministries of 
Education and University Affairs both provide tertiary education. 
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 (Doner and Brimble, 1996).  Finally, all of these initiatives have suffered from a lack of 
systematic private-sector input.  
 
At first glance, Malaysian institutions appear significantly more centralized and cohesive than in 
Thailand. In fact, however, once outside the inner sanctum of the Prime Minister’s executive 
offices and agencies, the bureaucracy is highly fragmented, disconnected, and duplicative with 
few linkages to the private sector (Ritchie, forthcoming). Rather than the line ministries, it is 
executive-level bodies, such as the Economic Planning Unit, Office of Technology Policy, and 
Malaysian Business Council that coordinate economic, investment, and technology policy.  Line 
ministry implementation at the sectoral level has been hampered by a lack of qualified personnel 
and by institutional fragmentation.  MIDA, for example, lacks responsibility for fostering 
subcontracting linkages and the Prime Minister’s Office exercises significant discretion over 
some of the country’s most important industrial initiatives.  This discretion is in turn justified by 
the need for distributive policies to favor ethnic Malays (Bumiputera) over ethnic Chinese.37 
Ethnic politics have had two deleterious effects.  One is to direct most upgrading efforts, such as 
SME promotion, towards promoting the entry of new Bumiputera firms, rather than towards 
broad technological support for existing manufacturers (Felker 2000: 20).  The second is to 
generate mistrust on the part of ethnic Chinese manufacturers who fear that participation in 
government assistance programs will lead only to more exposure to tax and regulatory 
authorities (Ibid. 22).  The overall result is to weaken public-private linkages.   
 
The exception to this fragmentation is Penang, where the PDC has been relatively unified, 
consulting effectively with and linking both multinationals and local firms.  The fact that local 
firms in Penang are just as ethnic Chinese as elsewhere in Malaysia suggests the impact of 
broader political factors on institutional capacities.  
 
V.   Explaining Institutional Capacity: External Threats, Domestic Coalitions 
Explaining these policy and institutional differences, at least prior to the 1997 crisis, requires 
understanding the incentives of politicians in building institutions and devising industry-specific 
policies. Our explanation emphasizes two related factors: external pressures and coalitional 
bases.38  
 
External pressures, including security challenges from other countries and economic shocks of 
various sorts, typically have an important influence on the course of national development. Most 
generally, they expand the ability of political leaders to build new institutions and launch policy 
initiatives. More specifically, external shocks can influence the attention national leaders give to 
manufacturing, and export-oriented manufacturing as a way of garnering foreign exchange in 
particular. 
 
Singapore's national institutions emerged in the 1960s as the country faced a diverse set of 
external challenges: security threats from Indonesia, the loss of a domestic market and access to 
                                                          
37 It is interesting that the PM feels it necessary to retain control over these initiatives to “ensure that the interests of 
the Bumi’s are safeguarded” when that was the main rationale and mandate behind the creation of the Majlis 
Amanah Rakyat Agency, which is part of the Ministry of Entrepreneurial Development. 
38  This is drawn almost directly from MDH (2000: Chapter 9).  If retained, it needs to be modified. 
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 natural resources after its 1965 expulsion from Malaysia, and the departure of British military 
protection in the late-1960s. In response, the People's Action Party developed a national security 
strategy that had a strong economic component. The weakness of the country's manufacturing 
base (most indigenous firms were in trade and finance) led the government toward an emphasis 
on foreign investment-led growth.   
 
Penang is of course part of Malaysia and therefore was not faced with Singapore's security 
challenges.  But in other respects, Penang resembled Singapore. It not only lacked natural 
resources but also lost a key revenue-generating resource when its port facilities were made 
redundant as the bulk of Malaysia’s entrepôt trade activities were transferred to a newly built, 
modern port in Klang, just outside of Kuala Lumpur. Penang's political leaders reacted to these 
challenges by consciously emulating Singapore's development strategy and institutions, albeit 
under constraints associated with Malaysia's federal structure.  
Thailand illustrates another institutional variant based on a slightly different combination of 
threats.  Like Singapore but unlike Penang, Thailand has faced significant external security 
threatsfirst from colonialism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and subsequently from 
the wars in Indochina.  Unlike both Singapore and Penang, however, Thailand was able to gain 
ample foreign exchange through large exports of natural resources, especially rice.  National 
independence and political legitimacy therefore required a central bank and Finance Ministry 
sufficiently cohesive and expert to provide the macroeconomic bases for sustained natural 
resource exports.  A bureaucracy focused on manufactured export promotion, however, was not 
critical. 
 
But the simple existence of threats does not necessarily mean that institutions will emerge to 
address them.  Political elites' ability to create institutions is also a function of their coalitional 
bases.  Singapore's ruling People's Action Party came to power at least in part in opposition to 
indigenous business interests.  Challenged on the left, the PAP needed to expand its support from 
within the working class.  The result has been a regime that, despite its reliance on 
multinationals, is best described as an authoritarian social democracy.   On the one hand, the 
People’s Action Party-led government has historically had significant leeway to develop 
institutions that make use of foreign capital, even to the detriment of local firms.  On the other 
hand, the People’s Action Party’s emphasis on increasing value added and on local skills 
development reflects the importance of satisfying an important working class constituency.  
 
Decline in electoral support for the PAP in the early-to-mid 1980s reflected working class 
frustration over increasing income inequalities and the resentment of a middle class deprived of 
political rights and corporate participation in the country's economy.  The government responded 
with programs such as the LIUP designed to strengthen indigenous firms, albeit through linkages 
to foreign producers. This subtle turn to domestic business contributed to policies that in turn had 
the effect of promoting a local supplier base, one of Singapore's key location-specific assets. 
 
Coalitional factors were equally important for Penang’s ability to respond to its external 
challenges by promoting both the expansion of foreign based multinationals and the growth of an 
associated group of local suppliers. Penang is the only Malaysian state with an ethnic Chinese 
majority.  As a result, the state’s political leadership is more inclined to pursue a development 
strategy that promotes the interests of local Chinese firms than are governments in the rest of 
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 Malay-dominated Malaysia.  Second, because of its utility as an alliance partner to the ruling 
coalition, Penang's political elite has been given the policy autonomy to pursue its own 
development strategy, including promoting industry-specific institutions and policies for 
advancing the electronics sector.  The result is an effort to integrate MNC upgrading with 
indigenization.  
 
Thailand again differs, both with regard to coalitional bases and the cohesion of the state elite 
more generally.  Historically, the key supporters of Thailand’s political leadership were found in 
the urban-based banking and industrial sectors.  Both of these sectors developed in large part 
through revenues generated from agricultural exports.  Until quite recently, none of these three 
sectors pressed for the kind of industry-specific institutions and collective goods evident in 
Singapore or Penang.  This is obvious for agriculture and banking, less so for industrialists.  
Many local manufacturers expanded simply through cheap labor; indeed, labor-intensive 
manufactured goods such as textiles constituted the key to Thailand's boom in the 1980s and 
early 1990s.  Another group of more skill- and capital-intensive local firmspresumably those 
with the potential to supply the disk drive firmsexpanded through access to a protected 
domestic market in areas such as automobiles and consumer electronics.  Thai governments have 
provided tariffs in part for revenue purposes but also due to the political strength of these 
producers.   Meanwhile the government provides incentives for foreign-based multinationals to 
operate freely in Thailand but not to increase value added.  All of this has resulted in powerful 
constituencies that do not need and/or are suspicious of industry-specific support.  They have 
therefore accommodated themselves to the bureaucracy’s fragmentation.  And they have 
reinforced the bureaucracy’s lack of interest in and capacity for institutions, goods and services 
necessary for competitive upgrading.  The result is a highly fragmented industrial structure in 
which multinationals operate in isolation not only from one another, but also local suppliers.  
Unlike Penang, and more recently Singapore, indigenization has occurred at the expense of 
upgrading.39 
 
VI.  The Crisis and National Responses 
 
The disk drive industry experienced a severe cyclical downturn in 1997-1998.  This fall 
occurred prior to and independently of the region’s broader economic crisis.   But, given 
the region’s heavy reliance on electronics exports, the fall in exports of “computers and 
parts” (led by hard drives) exacerbated the crisis.40  The national impact varied.  For 
Singapore, this combination of disk drive problems and regional crisis exposed the 
country’s high reliance on key electronics sectors (Wong 2000: 11). For Thailand, the 
persistent current account deficit contributing to the crisis was a further wake-up call 
regarding the country’s lack of supporting industry and resulting high import content in 
                                                          
39  An illustrative case: A Singaporean baseplate producer, MMI, grew in part through development of extrusion 
techniques. Support from Conner, subsequently part of Seagate, was key to MMI’s growth.  Presumably this 
relationship was “fostered” either directly or indirectly by Singapore state officials and incentives (Poh-kam?).  
There are similar cases in Penang.  We can find no such cases in Thailand. 
40  The impact of the crisis on disk drive firms depended on whether they had denominated their transactions in local 
currencies vs. the U.S. dollar.   Those that denominated transactions in the Thai baht suffered significant financial 
losses as a result of the baht’s devaluation (Author interview, Read-Rite engineer, March 2001).  
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 exports.41  For Malaysia, as we shall see, the crisis does not seem to have been a wake-up 
call. Rather, Malaysia saw the crisis as something completely exogenous: as an externally 
induced calamity that had little to do with any structural weakness of their own (with the 
possible exception of the banking sector).  
 
How then did each of the three countries respond to these threats?  Perhaps not surprisingly, 
given its continued concern with reducing its external vulnerability, the crisis seems to have had 
the most obvious and far reaching impact on Singapore. But while the primary influence has 
been to accelerate existing direction and strategy, elements of a more nationalist approach to 
technological development have also emerged, albeit not in the traditional, mercantile sense. 
 
In the mid 1990s, the Singapore government began to talk of transitioning from an intensive 
industrial economy to a knowledge-based economy. To do so, Singapore would have to create a 
world-class science and technology base (National Science Technology Plan (NSTP), 1996:6). 
The original NSTP envisioned that it would take between 10 and 15 years to reach these 
objectives. An official at the ministry of trade and industry indicated that the crisis had 
compacted the original 10-15 year estimates into 5-7 years.42  As an indicator of this 
acceleration, since 1997 there has been an explosion of government initiatives designed to foster 
the development of science and technology, both with regards to training and R&D (see table 1 
at end of paper). 
 
Much of this effort continues to be focused on acquiring technology and expertise directly from 
multinationals.  Nevertheless, although MNCs continue to play the primary role in Singapore’s 
ongoing technological development strategy, new elements of technology development with a 
distinctly nationalist orientation are emerging, albeit not in a traditional technonationalist sense. 
By the mid-1990s it was clear that two problems existed with the MNC-led technology strategy. 
First, most of the SMEs that MNCs had helped to create were rooted in low- to mid-level 
technologies.43 Firms with higher-level technologies, such as those supplying precision-
engineered parts to the disk drive industry, were involved much more in process as opposed to 
design development. But second and perhaps more troubling, although it was clear that the 
MNCs were upgrading the level of technology within their organizations, even to the point of 
high-level product R&D, the number of spin-offs was low. Thus, the economy was 
technologically top-heavy: many large MNCs and few small, “technopreneurial” firms. To 
respond to this gap, the government has expanded its strategy to include the creation of new, and 
in many cases publicly funded, technology ventures. 
 
There are at least two reasons for this additional policy direction, one more closely 
approximating the technonationalist model and the other not. First, this thrust is not 
technonationalist in that rather than seeking to replace foreign-based multinationals, it simply 
seeks to fill an economic gap not met by existing strategies. As a director at the NSTB put it, “we 
need to support the MNCs with a vibrant source of new, niche technologies that can enhance the 
                                                          
41 Lauridsen (1999: 18), who also notes that concerns about supporting industries expressed in the mid-1980s faded 
away in the wake of the 1987-94 boom. 
42 Author interview, July-September 2000. 
43 Clearly this was not the case for all firms. Firms such as Creative Technologies led their respective industries in 
technological development. 
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 capacities and technologies of foreign MNCs. In this way, new MNCs will be attracted to 
Singapore and existing MNCs will be encouraged to upgrade their facilities.”  If spin-offs from 
the MNCs had been filling this gap, there would have been no reason for government to get 
involved. But second, the crisis placed in stark relief the vulnerability of Singapore having all its 
proverbial eggs in one basket. In a very real sense, the government saw this effort as an 
opportunity not only to support and enhance the MNC sector, but also to create indigenous firms 
with the capacity to develop on the technological frontier. Thus, the ideal technological 
relationship between MNC and SME would be bi-directional with the public research institutes 
playing a critical linking role between the two. 
 
Malaysia’s response, on the other hand, focuses less on industrial efficiency and more on ethnic 
redistribution and what might be termed financial nationalism.   The government has responded 
to the crisis by committing itself to a more selective industrial policy driven primarily by private-
sector patterns of specialization rather than state plans. In addition, it has also formally 
announced a revamping of the educational and training system to meet the requirements of a 
rapidly evolving industrial structure (Felker, 1999:24).   Nevertheless, more than a year after this 
announcement was made, there had been little agreement on the substance of the reforms, let 
alone any concrete action. Part of the difficulty in carrying out educational reform may be due to 
the government’s continued commitment to intervene in the economy to promote Bumiputera 
interests. But equally problematic, the bureaucracy responsible for education and training is 
highly fragmented and politicized making agreement and cooperation on education and training 
policy very difficult. 
 
Unlike Thailand or Singapore, Malaysia responded to the crisis by implementing capital controls, 
the short-term result of which was to suppress FDI. The prime minister’s office convened a 
National Economic Action Council, which met every morning to assess the effects of the crisis. 
Capital being siphoned to Singapore, primarily by ethnic Chinese business owners, was given 
one month to return or it would not be allowed to return at all. Although initially viewed with 
skepticism, many in the international community are grudgingly admitting that these 
controversial initiatives have been effective: the Malaysian economy grew 5.6 percent in 1999 
and many analysts expect it to grow at better than 7 percent in 2000. 
 
Many in government, including Mahatir, see this evidence as vindicating Malaysia’s strategy of 
fostering foreign investment while actively working to ensure distributional equity. From the 
government’s perspective, Malaysia is on track to reach vision 2020. 44 As has been the case 
historically, the government continues to call on businesses to “forgo some short-term profits in 
exchange for longer-term ethical [read ethnic] goals.”45 The primary focus of the government is 
not on increasing underlying training and education or R&D capacity, but rather on “trying to 
balance the development of the indigenous people with the non-indigenous Chinese and 
Indians.”46 
 
                                                          
44 Mahatir Mohammad. “Malaysia on track for 2020 Vision.” 10 January 1999. 
 
45 Speech given by Mahatir on 29 August 2000 at the 21st Century Conference to Commemorate the Establishment 
of the Un Ismail Ali Chair in Monetary and Financial Economics. 
46 Mahatir Mohammad. “Many Challenges Lie Ahead.” 5 June 2000. 
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 This is reflected in a comparison between the Skills Development Fund in Singapore and the 
Human Resource Development Fund in Malaysia and their respective responses to the crisis. 
First, the SDF increased its training and education effort in the face of the crisis while in 
Malaysia the tendency was to decrease the amount of training (See Table 2 at end of paper). At 
the same time both countries tried to lessen the burden of the levy on business. Singapore 
dropped the wage level requirement from S$1500 to S$1000 during the crisis (although they 
have since raised it again). This ensured that all firms with low-cost labor would continue to bear 
the costs of the program evenly; it simply reduced the amount each would pay. Malaysia, on the 
other hand, exempted 28 industries from paying their levy for 11 months while another 10 were 
given 6 additional months reprieve. The remaining industries continued to pay the levy through 
the downturn (the Malaysian report does not detail which industries were exempted, although it 
is widely believed that politics played a significant role).47 
 
The Thai response to the crisis was perhaps the most impressive with regard to policy and 
institutional initiatives, if not in terms of achievements. The outbreak of the crisis spawned 
extensive discussion and research on Thailand’s declining competitiveness.  These concerns 
were especially serious in light of increasing pressures for liberalization under new WTO 
agreements and imminent regional trade agreements (AFTA).  The World Bank sponsored major 
research on weaknesses in the manufacturing sector48 as foreign experts lambasted Thai 
producers for their high costs and low quality, and local industry association officials claimed 
that Thai firms could cut costs as much as 50 percent by identifying inefficiencies in 
manufacturing (Yuthana 1998).  
 
Simultaneously, officials in the Ministry of Industry initiated an extensive set of public-private 
discussions with representatives of almost all sectors of the economy.  In terms of process, this 
was a real effort to promote bottom-up exchanges and reach consensus on both problems and 
solutions.  These discussions highlighted Thai producers’ general lack of attention to 
productivity issues and resulted in a comprehensive Industrial Restructuring Plan.  The Plan 
explicitly recognized the need to move out of low wage, mass production activities through 
measures such as skills upgrading and SME support.   To these ends, it proposed specific 
productivity-enhancing measures for 13 of Thailand’s most important industries (including 
electrical appliances and electronics). Some of these efforts, especially in the area of training, 
drew on Singapore’s programs.  More broadly, the Plan explicitly proposed “inducing FDI in 
strategic industries with technologies for the future” (“Thailand’s Industrial Restructuring Plan”).  
And in terms of process, the plan called for more systematic public-private consultation.  
 
The crisis also prompted significant efforts at institution building.  This included measures to 
strengthen the BOI’s capacity for technology promotion and the creation of eight public-private 
institutes designed to address productivity issues in key sectors such as textiles, autos, food and 
electronics.  It also led to calls for greater bureaucratic centralization, cohesion and insulation 
from political influences.  In fact, in May 2000 the Civil Service Commission proposed the 
creation of a Ministry of International Trade and Industry (“Revamp spawns...”).  Although 
                                                          
47 SDF annual report 1998/1999. HRDF annual report 1998. 
48  See the papers prepared for the conference on Thailand’s Dynamic Economic Recovery and Competitiveness 
(Bangkok, May 20-21). 
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 immediately opposed by the Foreign Affairs Ministry as an out-of-date, Japanese-style institution 
(Woranuj 2000), the MITI proposal is significant because it highlights government awareness of 
the need to combine responsibilities for manufacturing  (presently under the Ministry of 
Industry) and export promotion (under the Ministry of Commerce).  
 
The results of these efforts thus far are uncertain at best.  Although Thai manufactured exports 
grew in a number of sectors, the core problems of low productivity and a weak supplier base 
persists.  Indeed, a senior Ministry of Industry official stated outright that, owing to “red tape and 
lack of cooperation from the private sector,” the industrial restructuring program “was a failure 
in terms of boosting efficiency and cooperation” (“New lease on life...”).  Whether or not this is 
the case in all sectors, it seems clear enough in electronics and disk drives: Government agencies 
have not given much support to initiatives for a disk drive training program along the lines of 
Singapore’s course.49 
 
VII. Conclusions / Implications 
Several points emerge from the preceding account. 
Sources of policy and institutional change:  
An analysis of national responses to a crisis requires greater attention to the factors influencing 
policy and institutional change.  In our effort to explain cross-national differences in preferences 
and institutional capacities, we emphasized structural factors: external vulnerability and 
coalitional bases.  But these may not be all that powerful for explaining the shorter-term impact 
of external shocks even if, as we have argued, there are strong pressures for convergence.  After 
all, there is a long tradition of scholarship demonstrating divergent national responses to similar 
external pressures.  To draw a parallel with the endogenous growth literature, economic 
institutions have a lot of tacitness; many “need to be developed locally, relying on hands-on 
experience, local knowledge, and local experimentation” (Rodrik 1999: 16).  
 
Several approaches might be useful in this regard.   One, a “national systems” literature, asks 
whether new institutions are complementary with existing arrangements; perhaps even more 
important, it notes that institutional systems, as well as capacities for adaptation and quick 
evolution within these systems, vary across countries. A second assesses the impact of ideas and 
norms on policy and institutional reforms. This approach is particularly relevant in an era of 
increasing globalization. How much of a country’s technological strategy is influenced by the 
dissemination of norms and ideas through increasing economic liberalization?   And a third 
emphasizes the impact of “veto players”—the number and cohesion of actors with decision-
making authority. The veto player literature brings us to the broader political topic—namely, the 
impact of various types of electoral rules and various types of democratization.  This seems 
especially important in light of the contrast between Singapore’s cohesive response to the crisis 
and Thailand’s game but comparatively ineffectual efforts. 
 
                                                          
49 Author interviews. 
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 Regional options?   
We argued at the outset of this paper that successful engagement with globalized production 
networks requires convergence toward technology upgrading through strong local institutions.  
However, where value chains contain labor-intense activities, and where such components are 
best located proximate to higher value added activities, opportunities remain for low-wage 
countries without the capacity for upgrading.  This does, however, assume a regional 
convergence to the Southeast Asian standard of free trade and investment regimes. 
 
Techno-models: 
Our review of Southeast Asian policies and institutions provides evidence that 
globalist/nationalist categories for technological trajectories are of limited use when viewed in 
isolation.  The strategy of “MNC-induced technological learning” implies a combination of more 
nationalist objectives (greater autonomy seeking) with relatively globalist means (reliance on 
foreign firms for technological spillovers).  Globalist means may in turn be mixed up with strong 
nationalist means in the form of strong support for indigenous producers.  And if Singapore’s 
recent moves into the promotion of “technopreneurship” are an indication, more successful 
developing countries may move toward increasing nationalist means.  Indeed, Singapore’s recent 
initiatives are beginning to resemble Taiwan’s strategy of promoting local firms through its own 
public research institutes rather than through multinational auspices.  But such a strategy may be 
more useful in a more stable industry such as autos or even CD-ROMS than in an industry with 
highly rapid technological change such as disk drives.50  
                                                          
50 This is the conclusion from an examination of Taiwan’s ambitious but ultimately unsuccessful effort at local disk 
drive production (MDH 2000: Chapter 10). 
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 Table 1: New Government Initiatives since 1997 
 
Initiative/Program 
 
Objective 
 
Lead 
Agency 
 
Details 
 
Education and Training 
 
 
 
 
 
People Developer 
Standard 
 
Corporate Training 
Systems 
 
PSB 
 
S$50,000 per firm to set up 
holistic training programs 
 
Skills 
Redevelopment 
Fund 
 
Training of retrenched 
and older workers 
 
NTUC 
 
Pays for both training and 
compensates employers for 
training time away from work 
 
Manpower 
Development 
Assistance Scheme 
 
Develop training 
facilities inside firms 
 
MoM 
 
Reimburses costs up to a 
specified amount to create in-
house training 
 
Initiatives in New 
Technology 
 
Train high-level 
technical talent 
 
EDB 
 
Reimbursed up to 70 percent for 
training outside of Singapore or 
to bring in outside expertise to 
train Singaporeans 
 
Manpower 21 
 
Engage government, 
labor, and the private 
sector to meet human 
resource needs in the 
next century 
 
MoM 
 
Government is evaluating several 
new peak cooperative 
organizations to facility training 
and education 
 
(no official name) 
 
Recruit highly trained 
foreign labor 
 
NSTB 
 
Subsidized housing, salary 
reimbursement, extended visas, 
etc. for foreign workers 
 
Technopreneurship 
21 
 
Develop tertiary 
institutions into 
generators of both 
manpower and 
business opportunities 
 
NSTB 
 
Undisclosed amount of funds 
 
Manpower  
upgrading for 
Science and 
Technology 
 
Develop R&D and 
Technopreneurship 
capacity in local firms 
through training and 
post-graduate studies. 
 
NTSB 
 
1. Training attachment / 
internship to local and overseas 
companies and local and overseas 
trainers to the companies. Help 
with financial, legal, and info. 
services. 2. Grants for advanced 
degrees at local and overseas 
universities 
 
Critical Infocomm 
Technology 
 
Create specialized IT 
talent 
 
IDA 
 
S$2 million to train 1000 IT 
professionals. Reimburse up to 
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 Resource Program 50 percent of costs. 
 
Research and Development 
 
 
 
 
 
NTSB Venture 
Funding 
 
Provide seed funds for 
new technologies 
 
NSTB 
 
Funds for university incubators, 
public research institutes, and 
private firms 
 
University 
Technology 
Incubators 
 
Provide opportunities 
for students to develop 
new technologies while 
learning “culture” of 
high-tech 
productization 
 
MoE 
 
Provide space and infrastructure 
to encourage technology 
development 
 
Pioneer Tax 
Incentives (or 
extensions) 
 
Encourage private 
firms to invest in 
formal R&D centers 
 
EDB 
 
Renew or provide tax incentives 
to firms doing product and design 
R&D 
 
Technopreneurship 
Fund 
 
Attract venture capital 
activities 
 
NSTB 
 
US$1billion fund to invest in new 
technologies 
 
INTECH 
 
Upgrade the 
technology in local 
firms 
 
EDB 
 
Reimburse costs for transferring 
technology (both process and 
product) to Singapore 
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Table 2: HRDF and SDF Comparison 
 
 
 
HRDF 
 
SDF 
 
 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
Training Places 
Committed 
 
533,227 
 
409,242 
 
502,686 
 
530,755 
 
Grants 
Committed 
 
RM159.49 
million 
 
RM138.79 
million 
 
S$86.52 million 
 
S$88.41 million 
 
Applications 
Received 
 
Not reported 
 
Not reported 
 
52,990 
 
53,368 
Sources: SDF Annual Report, 98/99; HRDF Annual Report, 1998. 
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